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Abstract In this lecture I first give an explanation for invidious preferences based
on the (evolutionary) competition for resources. Then I show that these preferences
have wide ranging and empirically relevant effects on labor markets, such as: work-
place skill segregation, gradual promotions, wage increases that have no relation with
productivity and downward wage flexibility. I suggest that labor and human resource
economics can benefit from including envy into the standard set of factors considered
in their theoretical and empirical models.
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1 Introduction
My talk today will be about envy, which Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines
as: “Painful or resentful awareness of an advantage enjoyed by another joined with a
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Fig. 1 Mini-ultimatum game
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desire to possess the same advantage.” The recent interest of game theorists in the topic
arises most probably from the experiments with the ultimatum game, first reported by
Güth et al. (1982). The game has a simple structure, similar to the game in Fig. 1.
Two individuals have to divide an amount of money. One of them, the proposer, has
the right to propose a split among several possible ones. His opponent, the responder,
can accept the proposal or reject it. If he accepts, the split is implemented and both
players get their rewards. If he rejects it, none of them gets any money. The experiments
have been done in many different ways and with differing subject pools, including
capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal 2003). The near universal result is that lop-
sided offers in favor of the proposer get rejected very often (for a survey, see Roth
1995). This is surprising for many economists. The logic of backward induction sug-
gests that a “natural” outcome of this game is that the responder should accept any
offer that gives him a positive amount, since even a little bit is better than nothing.
Expecting this, the proposer would offer something very large for himself and small
for the responder. It is hard to understand these results unless a responder who rejects
a positive offer is experiencing a “painful or resentful awareness of an advantage
enjoyed by another”. That is, the responder must be feeling envy.
The implications of this result extend well beyond the experimental laboratory.
For example, there is significant field evidence that envy plays an important role in
the life of organizations. Bewley (1999)1 interviewed personnel managers from many
different companies. About 78% of them2 mentioned internal equity as an important
concern for internal harmony and morale,3 as well as to reduce turnover.4
In this talk, I will first answer a question that, in my view, has been somewhat
neglected in the literature. After the initial surprise about the experimental result (and
a period of denial) a robust literature has grown to explain it. This has been done
1 Other papers that offer survey evidence on the importance of equity concerns in organizations are Blinder
and Choi (1990), Bewley (1995), Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997).
2 Bewley (1999, Table 6.5).
3 Bewley (1999, p. 42).
4 Bewley (1999, Table 6.5).
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mostly by showing that some utility functions with interdependent preferences can
help us understand a variety of apparently puzzling experimental and field observa-
tions. I will argue that while this helps us to organize the results, it is not enough to
properly make sense of them. Our preferences should be shaped by natural evolution.
And Nature would not be kind to genes who “left money on the table”. Why do they
persist then? Just like natural scientists and game theorists have devoted (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981; Nowak 2006; Pennisi 2009) a large amount of effort to understand
the emergence of cooperative traits in humans and other animals, we should devote
some time to understand the emergence of invidious preferences.
After discussing how envy can be sustained over time, I will review some work I
have done recently on the consequences of envy in labor markets. I conclude by briefly
reviewing other people’s findings on the economic effects of envy.
2 The causes of envy
As I have already mentioned, a usual “explanation” for the experimental and field
results, not only in bargaining, but also for games of voluntary contributions to public
goods, or for the prisoners’ dilemma, is that people have interdependent preferences.
To be more precise, consider a two player game, and let xi be the monetary payoff of
player i ∈ {1, 2} in that game, and x−i the monetary reward of i’s opponent. Then,
the preferences proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (2000a)
or Charness and Rabin (2002), can be expressed:
Bolton–Ockenfels preferences
vi = xi − αi
(
xi
xi + x−i −
1
2
)2
,
Fehr–Schmidt preferences
vi = xi − αi max {x−i − xi , 0} − βi max {xi − x−i , 0} ,
Charness–Rabin preferences
vi = xi − (αi − θiφ j ) max {x−i − xi , 0} − (βi + θiφ j ) max {xi − x−i , 0}
where φ j = −1 if j “has misbehaved”, and φ j = 0 otherwise.
Both Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (2000a,b) make special
emphasis in the fact that their models can give account of a large number of experi-
mental phenomena. But since today I am not particularly interested in the evolution
of altruism, the crucial feature for me is that when xi < x−i
∂vi
∂x−i
< 0 (1)
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Following the dictionary definition with which I started my talk, I will consider (1)
to be my formal definition of envy, the “painful or resentful awareness of an advan-
tage enjoyed by another.” A formal definition, while satisfactory to study the economic
implications of envy, is still somewhat unsatisfactory. I think we need to dig a bit more
to understand the origins of the phenomenon. After all, every time that our evolution-
ary ancestors left unused resources on the table, their genes would not replicate as well
as those of others who took the money. And remember that even capuchin monkeys do
leave money on the table. Since they are cousins of those ancestors of ours, it seems
likely that the observation is not simply a maladaptation that follows from our modern
way of life, which is hopelessly removed from the one in our evolutionary past.
Let me now sketch a model that I think can shed light into the reasons why we
prefer to reject lopsided offers in ultimatum bargaining. After I describe the model, I
will also sketch some empirical implications which can be derived from it. This will
serve as an introduction for the section reviewing the economic effects of envy.
The main assumption with which I will work is that any bargaining game is a part
of a much larger game of life. In more technical terms, ultimatum (or any other kind
of) bargaining is a subgame of the game of life. The key idea is that the outcome of
the first stage influences payoffs in second stage. Let us now define one such game:
The game of life has two players and two stages, which we call:
1. Bargaining.
2. Consumption and competitive mating.
The first stage payoffs are denoted xi where i ∈ {1, 2}.
In the second stage, each player i has to decide: ci and ei , where ci is consump-
tion and ei is the effort made in obtaining a mate. The first stage payoffs are also
the resources available in the second stage. These resources are distributed between
consumption and effort, so that xi = ei + ci .
The utility/fitness (number of successors) of player i is:
ui (ci , ei , e−i ) = ui (xi − ei , ei , e−i ) ≡ vi (xi , ei , e−i )
Assumption 1 (i) ∂2vi/∂xi∂ei > 0 and ∂2vi/∂ei∂e−i > 0. (ii) ∂vi/∂e−i < 0
This implies that vi is supermodular (ei and e−i are strategic complements). Let
x∗i , e∗i for i ∈ {1, 2} be the equilibrium values of the choice variables, and v∗i the
equilibrium payoff.
Proposition 1 (1) The equilibrium value of ei is increasing in xi and x−i .
(2) The equilibrium payoff is decreasing in x−i .
Proof 1 (1) Immediate from supermodularity.
(2)
∂v∗i
∂x−i
= ∂vi
∂e−i
∂e∗−i
∂x−i
< 0
since by assumption (1) (ii) ∂vi
∂e−i < 0 and
∂e∗−i
∂x−i > 0 by (1)
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Remark 1 The equilibrium payoff is increasing in xi when
∂v∗i
∂xi
= ∂vi
∂xi
+ ∂vi
∂e−i
∂e∗−i
∂xi
> 0
Let us now give two examples of utility functions which satisfy the conditions in
Assumption (1). In both of them αi is a parameter which denotes the relative impor-
tance for the fitness of individual i ∈ {1, 2} of competitive mating.
Example 1
ui (ci , ei , e−i ) = c1/2i + αi
(
1
2
+ ei − e−i
)1/2
= (xi − ei )1/2 + αi
(
1
2
+ ei − e−i
)1/2
e∗i =
1
α2i + 2
((
α2i + 1
)
xi + x−i + 1
α2i
− 1
2
)
v∗i =
α2i + 1
α2i + 2
(
xi − x−i − 1
α2i
+ 1
2
)1/2
Example 2
ui (ci , ei , e−i ) = c1/2i + αi
(
1
2
+ ei − e−i
)
= (xi − ei )1/2 + αi
(
1
2
+ ei − e−i
)
e∗i = xi −
1
4α2i
v∗i =
1
2αi
+ αi
(
1
2
+ xi − x−i
)
In words, an increase in the payoff of i’s opponent payoff in stage 1 makes him
more competitive in stage 2. For this reason, i’s payoff in stage 2 is decreasing in
−i’s stage 1 rewards. Hence, when analyzing the game in stage 1, the payoff of i
has a similar structure to the one studied by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and
Schmidt (2000a) or Charness and Rabin (2002). At this point a question may arise in
some reader’s mind. Given that the utility function v∗i is an indirect utility function,
is this really a model of envy? Or is it more a reasonable way to explain an empirical
finding that people tend to interpret as envy? My reply would be that emotions, like
envy, hunger or lust, are simply the mechanisms that our genes use to enforce behavior
on our part which maximizes evolutionary fitness (this is what vi represents). So envy
is what induces in humans actions consistent with the fact that ∂v∗i /∂x−i < 0.
13
376 SERIEs (2010) 1:371–386
Beyond a better understanding of the origins of the phenomenon, a model like the
one I am proposing has the advantage that it can explain when it will happen. Gurven
(2004), for example, has shown that among unrelated Amazon tribes, the ultimatum
game is played as if players did not have interdependent preferences. Members of
unrelated tribes are unlikely to compete for mates, or other evolutionarily important
resources, using the proceeds of the bargaining stage in the game of life. Hence,
they can simply maximize their monetary rewards when playing against one another.
More in general, the degree of apparent interrelatedness between two players’ payoffs
should be connected with the extent to which they are perceived to compete using the
resources obtained in the bargaining game. This is the main (and testable) implication
of the model. An implication that is heavily used in what follows.
3 The effects: theory
I now describe in some (but not complete) detail a theoretical model which shows
the usefulness of incorporating envy in the study of labor markets. The model is a
simplified version of the one by Cabrales et al. (2008)5 with just enough elements to
illustrate the mechanics of the more complicated model.
3.1 The model
Workers’ preferences We assume workers are risk averse and live for three periods
t = 0, 1, 2. These workers suffer envy, that is, they experience a disutility when they
see colleagues getting paid more than they do. The per-period utility is
U (w, u¯) = u(w) + α min (0, u(w) − u¯) ,
where u(·) is a twice differentiable, and strictly concave function. In accordance with
the model in Sect. 2, the reference utility, with respect to which an agent feels envy,
that is, u¯ = E[u(w)] is the the expected (or average) wage for workers that are psycho-
logically close enough to be considered evolutionary competitors in the game of life.
We take this to be the workers who in the previous period were in the same firm and
received the same wage as the worker.6 We assume there is no discounting between
periods.
Workers’ productivity Information is symmetric but imperfect because production
is random and depends on the type (Good or Bad) of the worker. The proportion of
G types in the population is λ. There are two possible levels of output (whose market
values are normalized to 1 and 0), and pi with i ∈ {G, B} is the probability of a high
5 That model, itself, is a simplified version of Harris and Hölmström (1982) where the main change is the
introduction of interdependent preferences.
6 Another way to justify this assumption is that sociologists and social psychologists have argued that group
identification arises through active interaction and fades away if not sustained (Coleman 1990). See also
van Dijk and van Winden (1997).
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outcome for a type i. We set pG = p > 0. For bad types, on the other hand, there
is no chance of a good outcome, i.e. pB = 0. Hence a good realization immediately
reveals the good workers.7 The production realizations of all workers are observed by
all firms in the market, which use them to make offers.
Firms There is a (continuum of) competitive risk-neutral, firms which employ the
workers with a constant returns to scale technology. The firms offer long-term, profit
maximizing contracts specifying a sequence of non-negative payments contingent on
observed history (which includes worker-firm assignments, production and types).
There is full commitment from the firm on the terms of the contract.
Workers’ action In each period t , the worker decides whether to stay in the firm or
accept an outside offer. If the worker decides to stay in the firm, he receives the wage
promised by his employer. He then produces (hence revealing some information about
his type). This new information is used by other firms (the market) to make job offers
and by the old firm to pay its promised t + 1 wages (which takes into account the
external labor market). Whenever a worker changes firm, he pays a fixed moving cost
k ≥ 0.
Histories We will concentrate on symmetric equilibria, where all workers in a firm
with the same observed history get the same wages.8 This makes it important that we
identify the relevant histories.
At the beginning of the world (t = 0), all workers are the same so that we call
the unique history h0. At t = 1 the two possibilities are denoted G or B.Finally at
t = 2, since workers who at time 0 already revealed to be G stay that way, there
are only three relevant histories: GG, B B, BG. The wages are then indexed by the
history of the worker. So we have w0 in t = 0, wG and wB in t = 1 and wGG, wBG
and wB B in t = 2.
Let P ′λ be the fraction of workers who did not produce in period 0 but produce in
period 1, that is:
P ′λ =
p (1 − p) λ
1 − λ + (1 − p) λ .
Notice that P ′λ < pλ.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Contracts when all workers stay but some participation constraints are binding
Rather than completely characterizing the equilibrium, I concentrate in giving a
detailed analytical intuition for some of its features.
7 Think of workers as academic economists and pi as the probability of a publication in SERIEs, Journal
of the Spanish Economic Association.
8 This can be easily justified through anti-discrimination laws.
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Since workers’ output only depends on his type, maximizing profit for the firms is
equivalent to minimizing period zero expected wage bills for each worker.
min w0 + pλ
[
wG + wGG
]
+ (1 − pλ)
[
wB + P ′λwBG +
(
1 − P ′λ
)
wB B
]
For this section we concentrate is studying the case where values of the moving costs
are such that it is optimal to let the workers stay in the firm, but when participation
constraints are binding for the workers in the different periods. We call U G the (mar-
ket) outside option for an agent with positive production in period 0, and U B the one
for a worker with no production in period 0.9 Then we call it U BG if the positive
production is not observed in period 0 but it is in period 1. Finally, the outside option
for an agent with no positive production in both periods 0 and 1 is U B B .
Remember that
U (w, u¯) = u(w) + α min (0, u(w) − u¯) ,
is the per-period utility function of the workers, where u¯ = E[u(w)] is the expected
wage for workers workers who in the previous period were in the same firm and
received the same wage as the worker. This means that any worker who produces a
positive amount will not experience envy after that moment, and hence min(0, u(w)−
u¯) = 0. With this in mind, the ex post participation constraints for the workers whose
first positive production happens, respectively, in period 1 and 0 are:
u
(
wBG
)
≥ U BG (2)
u
(
wG
)
+ u
(
wGG
)
≥ U G (3)
and we call φ and μ the multipliers associated, respectively, with constraints (2) and
(3). The constraints for workers who did not produce in period 0, and those who did
not produce either in period 0 or in 1 are:
u
(
wB
)
− αpλ
(
u
(
wG
)
− u
(
wB
))
+ P ′λu
(
wBG
)
+ (1 − P ′λ)
×
(
u
(
wB B
)
− αP ′λ
(
u
(
wBG
)
− u
(
wB B
)))
≥ U B
u
(
wB B
)
− αP ′λ
(
u
(
wBG
)
− u
(
wB B
))
≥ U B B .
The period zero constraint is:
u(w0) + pλ
(
u(wG) + u(wGG)
)
+ (1 − pλ)
[
u
(
wB
)
− αpλ
(
u(wG) − u(wB)
)]
+ (1 − pλ)
[
P ′λu(wBG) +
(
1 − P ′λ
) [
u
(
wB B
)
− αP ′λ
(
u
(
wBG
)
− u(wB B)
)]]
≥ U 0
(4)
and we call ξ the multiplier associated with constraint (4).
9 In the full version of the model, all these outside options are, of course, endogenous equilibrium objects.
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Guessing (which can be shown to be right) that in the case we are analyzing (when
workers stay in the firm but some participation constraints are binding) the binding
constraints of the problem are (2), (3) and (4) the first order conditions for this problem
are:
wGG : pλ − (μ + ξpλ) u′(wGG) = 0 (5)
wG : pλ − (μ + ξpλ) u′
(
wG
)
+ ξ (1 − pλ) αpλu′(wG) = 0 (6)
wB B : (1− pλ) (1−P ′λ)−ξ (1− pλ) (1 − P ′λ) (1 + αP ′λ) u′(wB B) = 0 (7)
wB : (1 − pλ) − ξ (1 − pλ) (1 + αpλ) u′(wB) = 0 (8)
w0 : 1 − ξu′ (w0) = 0 (9)
Using the equations above, we have an analog to one of the main results in Cabrales
et al. (2008).
1. Gradual promotions wG < wGG . Since ξ (1 − pλ) pλα > 0 we have from equa-
tions (5) and (6) that wG < wGG . That is, in order to save suffering, the planner
increases gradually the wage of the G workers. Notice that if α = 0 (as in Harris
and Hölmström 1982) consumption smoothing demands that wG = wGG . With
interdependent preferences, firms trade off consumption smoothing of the G work-
ers for morale enhancing for those not found out to be G yet. That is, an increase
in wages for period 1 and another for period 2 is not first-best for workers who
performed well already in period 0. But, on the other hand, raising their wage
slowly exploits the fact that by the end of period 1 the G workers go out of the
reference group of those who stay unproductive both in period 0 and 1 and hence
the pain caused on them by envy is smaller.
2. Productivity unrelated wage increases w0 < wB . Since αpλ > 0 then from equa-
tions (8) and (9) we have that w0 < wB . Again, from intertemporal smoothing
considerations alone (for example when α = 0), we would have w0 = wB . But
since all workers stay in the firm, the B workers will suffer from the fact that
others are G and, because of market pressures, their wage needs to rise. So firms
must trade off the intertemporal smoothing with the envy considerations.
3. No downward rigidity wB B < wB . Even though the ex-post participation con-
straint is not binding for B workers, since 0 < P ′λ < pλ, we have from equations
(8) and (7) that wB B < wB (again, when α = 0, we would have wB B = wB).
Here the reason for allowing the wages to go down from wB to wB B is as follows.
The wage goes up from w0 to wB because the B workers suffer when they see
others that were just like them in the previous period have their wages increase.
By the end of period 1, the workers that remain unproductive (those with B B
histories) have “forgotten” about those promoted at the end of period 0. And since
there are less promotions from 1 to 2 than from 0 to 1 because P ′λ < pλ (in other
words, the ex-ante probability of this event is smaller) the need to compensate for
this event is smaller.
Summarizing, w0 < wB B < wB so that for individuals with B or B B histo-
ries insurance is traded off versus suffering from envy. This yields a non-monotone
contract, which differs from the no-envy standard, under which w0 = wB B = wB .
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Additionally the individuals with a G observation have that wG < wGG so that
their insurance is traded off for the forgetting of the individuals with a B history.
Empirical implications for internal labor markets
Observation 1 is a well-accepted empirical finding. Wage increases are indeed serially
correlated in firm data (see Baker et al. 1994 and Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
Observation 2 implies that wage changes need not be connected with productivity
changes. Insurance motives would insulate wage from productivity, but in our
model, wages can increase even when worker expected productivity declines. Med-
off and Abraham (1980) and Flabbi and Ichino (2001) find that although (a proxy
for) productivity10 in a job is negatively related to experience, wages in fact increase
with experience. This is hard to obtain in a standard model,11 but it can happen
in ours, and it should be associated with a concomitant increase in the wages of a
reference peer group.
Observation 3 shows that we can have real wage cuts. The fact that in Harris and
Hölmström (1982) wages are downward rigid is considered to be one of the major
drawbacks of that model, because it is inconsistent with the substantial frequency
of negative real-wage changes found by Baker et al. (1994).
3.2.2 Mobility between firms and skill segregation
The model has also some predictions about mobility of workers between firms, which
we briefly discuss here.
Mobility without moving costs If k = 0, then firms hire from only one skill pool and
they only have either G or B workers (B B or BG if in the third period). There
is no intra-firm wage dispersion for workers of the same cohort, but inter-firm’s
dispersion is maximal. When there are no costs of moving between firms, they can
save on the cost of envy by segregating workers into different companies. This is
different from what happens in other models of worker segregation by skill level,
such as Kremer and Maskin (1996). In our case there is no direct externality created
by others’ types. Our agents do not experience “pain” directly from what others
are, but rather from an indirect effect through economic forces. In turn, these forces
shape the firms’ responses when costs are higher.
Mobility with moving costs Cabrales et al. (2008) also show that turnover affects work-
ers of only one type at any period. These turnover can be either quits (for high-
productivity G types) and layoffs (for low-productivity B types), but not both.
Moreover, the affected group is the one with less workers. Interestingly, in the
case of layoffs of low productivity workers, the firm will pay a severance payment
transfer. This happens because those workers have been promised, for insurance
reasons, a high wage. When efficiency indicates they need to go, the market will
10 Worker performance ratings.
11 Gibbons and Waldman (1999) (as well as Harris and Hölmström) argue that the productivity mea-
sure of Medoff and Abraham (1980) is not good. Flabbi and Ichino (2001) use other indicators (recorded
absenteeism and misconduct episodes) and they obtain the same result.
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not pay for this insurance. This payment is, of course, not made when G workers
leave.
Empirical relevance of mobility results A lot of research has gone into connecting a
rise in wage inequality across firms and sorting of workers by ability (the earliest we
learnt of are Brown and Medoff 1989 and Davis and Haltinwanger 1991).12
As I have already mentioned, earlier theories that explained this fact tended to
assume technological complementarities between people with the same skill.13 Our
externality arises because of envy. This leads to some different empirical predictions
between the models. Both our model and Kremer and Maskin (1996) predict a con-
nection between an outflow of B workers and a wage increase for those remaining in
the firm. But in our model, the flow would happen after the increase in productivity.
In the Kremer and Maskin model, the worker flow must happen before the increase in
wage.
Another important difference is that their implications will be related to ex-ante
observable skills. Our model makes predictions about ex-ante unobservable skills.
Hence, our wage differential should occur after controlling for observables such as
education and industry. Interestingly, the recent rise in inequality is mostly connected
to unobservable factors.14
One implication of our model is that skill segregation should be decreasing with
mobility costs. Hence, our model predicts that the rise in inter-firm wage inequal-
ity should be associated with a change in mobility costs. Rhode and Strumpf (2003)
establish the existence of a secular decrease in mobility costs.15 This is not only true
of physical transportation costs and communication costs, but also of more intangible
ones. For example, more homogeneous public goods across US counties, or increased
similarity of cultures and working routines.
4 An experiment on mobility
4.1 The experiment
A more direct approach to check if worker-firm allocation is related to interdependent
preferences is taken by Cabrales et al. (2010), who study a game which is a simplified
version of the one in Winter (2004). A team of (in our case) 2 players has to undertake
a project. The team members can choose to make an effort or not to make it. The effort,
which has an individual cost c, makes the project succeed with a higher likelihood.
The efforts of the players are complementary. To be more precise the project succeeds
12 Many others followed: Kramarz et al. (1996), Kremer and Maskin (1996), Abowd et al. (1999), Acemoglu
(1999), Burgess et al. (2004), Dunne et al. (2004).
13 Beyond Kremer and Maskin (1996), other papers in this vein are de Bartolomé (1990), Bénabou (1993),
Saint-Paul (2001) and Legros and Newman (2002, 2004).
14 Juhn et al. (1993) and Katz and Autor (1999) attribute between two-thirds and three-fourths of the rise
in inequality to the within-group “residual”.
15 Mendez (2000) and Stewart (2002) show that rates of labor turnover have increased recently. This is an
indirect measure of mobility costs.
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with probability 0 if no team member makes an effort, with probability 1/4 if just one
member makes an effort and with probability 1 if both team members make the effort.
The principal, who earns a return of V if the project is successful, can only observe
(or contract upon) the success or failure of the project. So he has to choose a pair of
rewards (b1, b2) for the players in case of success. Under these conditions, the game
G faced by the players is:
G Player 2
Player 1
E N
E b1 − c, b2 − c 14 b1 − c, 14 b2
N 14 b1,
1
4 b2 − c 0, 0
Notice that if b2 > 4c, G is dominance solvable in (E, E). But (E, E) is an equilib-
rium already with 3b1 > 4c, 3b2 > 4c (and in that case (N , N ) is also an equilibrium.
Hence a game like this generates a tradeoff: efficient equilibrium selection vs. envy.
In the experiment, a principal chooses b1, b2, and agents choose E or N . We wanted
to answer several questions:
1. What is stronger: strategic uncertainty or “envy”?
2. Do interdependent preferences help organize the data?
3. Do interdependent preferences explain matching?
The design was chosen to help answer the questions. Subjects played three phases,
P1 to P3 (24 rounds per phase).
P1 : Dictator Game (24 rounds)
1. Players are randomly matched and allocated to a position (1, 2) in the pair. They
have four choices ck = (bk1, bk2), with bk1 > bk2 in all.
2. Both players choose their favorite Ck and one of these is chosen randomly.
P2 : Effort Game (24 rounds)
Identical to P1, but now subjects play game G with the chosen (bk1, bk2)
P3 : The Market (24 rounds)
1. Within each group, 4 subjects are randomly chosen to act as “Principals”.
2. Principals select one contract ck = (bk1, bk2) to be offered to the 4 teams of agents.
3. Agents have to choose and then play G.
4. The Principal earns V −bk1 −bk2 when the two agents make effort, (V −bk1 −bk2)/4
when only one makes effort, and zero otherwise.
4.2 The results
The results were organized in line with the questions motivating the research.
What is stronger: strategic uncertainty or “fairness”? The choices of the subjects
were clear in this respect. They chose contracts that induced games with unique equi-
libria more than three fourths of the time. In this, they were being quite rational. The
level of effort was much higher in those games.
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Do interdependent preferences help organize the data? Distributional preferences
estimated with data from P1 indeed explain behavior in P2 and P3. More precisely,
the estimated preferences/beliefs predict 80% of observed effort choice.
Do interdependent preferences explain matching? Agents are more likely to choose
a contract offered by a principal with similar distributional preferences to his own.
This result is connected with our theoretical prediction that without mobility costs
worker-firm matching is related to interdependent preferences.
5 Other approaches to envy and the labor markets
As we mentioned in the introduction, the research on interdependent preferences arose
to explain evidence that was hard to reconcile with material payoff maximization. We
have discussed several models16 in this vein, and the readers are referred to the surveys
of Fehr and Schmidt (2000b) and Sobel (2005) for further discussion.17
The model I discussed in this lecture is, of course, not the only one to explore the
labor market effects of envy. Frank (1984) is the first paper I know that explores this
issue. He finds that wages can diverge from marginal productivity when preferences
about others’ wages are strong and heterogeneous. He assumed that people like being
paid more than others and they dislike being paid less. With this in mind, the highly
able workers would get “taxed” by the firm employing them with a lower wage for the
pleasure of making more money than others. By the same token, the less productive
people would be “subsidized” with a higher wage to compensate them for the pain
inflicted by envy. Frank (1985) shows that the externality generated by interdependent
preferences can explain many labor market regulations, such as: minimum wages,
workplace safety rules or forced saving for retirement. Notice, though, that since his
agents enjoy having a higher wage than others, his model would predict (counterfac-
tually) the opposite of segregation by skill. This feature (as well as a static contracting
approach) is shared with Fershtman et al. (2006).
Fehr et al. (2007) show experimentally and theoretically that workers’ concerns
for equality may be a reason why many real-life contracts are left deliberately incom-
plete in environments with hidden effort. Rey-Biel (2008) shows that an employer can
exploit envy by “threatening” workers with inequality when outcomes are unsatisfac-
tory (a threat that does not have to carried out in equilibrium).
Teyssier (2007) studies a model with hidden effort. She shows that agents with
heterogeneous interdependent preferences segregate themselves into different firms.
In that way the more egalitarian agents are exposed to less steep incentive schemes
which generate less inequality. Teyssier (2008) provides an experimental test for the
theory in her previous paper. Kosfeld and von Siemens (2009), von Siemens (2009) and
16 Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (2000a) or Charness and Rabin (2002).
17 The model of Cabrales et al. (2008) innovated by specifying the individuals with which agents compared
themselves. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) also relate identity with incentive problems. The difference is that
for them identification gives incentives to make effort, whereas in our case it creates a disutility when people
with whom agents identify get paid more.
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Bartling and Von Siemens (2010) also study how interdependent preferences create
an incentive for agents to self-select into different firms.
6 Conclusions
In this lecture I have first tried to explain the existence of envy as a result of (evolu-
tionary) competition for resources. Then I have shown that invidious preferences have
important effects that are likely to show up in the labor markets and other parts of social
life. Hence, many branches of economics and other social sciences can be improved
by including envy in their theoretical and empirical models. To some extent this has
already started to happen. For example, Bandiera et al. (2010) show, with data from
a UK farm producer of soft fruit that “a given worker’s productivity is significantly
higher when she works alongside friends who are more able than her, and significantly
lower when she works with friends who are less able than her.” This is so even though
there are no externalities among workers due to either the production technology or
the compensation scheme in place. The authors themselves claim that “the results sug-
gest that firms can exploit social incentives as an alternative to monetary incentives to
motivate workers.”
I think that we can learn a lot by looking at, for example, labor market data with the
help of the ideas sketched in this paper. One possibility would be to look at large longi-
tudinal databases, if they had detailed information about a worker’s pay, as well as that
of his colleagues, and mobility between jobs in the same company and also between
companies. Alternatively, analysis of case studies like that of Bandiera et al. (2010)
or Baker et al. (1994) could also be useful, particularly if researchers were allowed to
observe the responses to controlled/experimental changes in the environment.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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